Abstract. In this paper we propose an efficient (string) OT 1 n scheme for any n ≥ 2. We build our OT 1 n scheme from fundamental cryptographic techniques directly. It achieves optimal efficiency in terms of the number of rounds and the total number of exchanged messages for the case that the receiver's choice is unconditionally secure. The computation time of our OT 1 n scheme is very efficient, too. The receiver need compute 2 modular exponentiations only no matter how large n is, and the sender need compute 2n modular exponentiations. The distinct feature of our scheme is that the system-wide parameters are independent of n and universally usable, that is, all possible receivers and senders use the same parameters and need no trapdoors specific to each of them. For our OT 1 n scheme, the privacy of the receiver's choice is unconditionally secure and the secrecy of the un-chosen secrets is based on hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. We extend our OT 1 n scheme to distributed oblivious transfer schemes. Our distributed OT 1 n scheme takes full advantage of the research results of secret sharing and is conceptually simple. It achieves better security than Naor and Pinkas's scheme does in many aspects. For example, our scheme is secure against collusion of the receiver R and t-1 servers and it need not restrict R to contact at most t servers, which is difficult to enforce. For applications, we present a method of transforming any singledatabase PIR protocol into a symmetric PIR protocol with only one extra unit of communication cost.
1 n scheme, the privacy of the receiver's choice is unconditionally secure and the secrecy of the un-chosen secrets is based on hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. We extend our OT 1 n scheme to distributed oblivious transfer schemes. Our distributed OT 1 n scheme takes full advantage of the research results of secret sharing and is conceptually simple. It achieves better security than Naor and Pinkas's scheme does in many aspects. For example, our scheme is secure against collusion of the receiver R and t-1 servers and it need not restrict R to contact at most t servers, which is difficult to enforce. For applications, we present a method of transforming any singledatabase PIR protocol into a symmetric PIR protocol with only one extra unit of communication cost.
Introduction
Rabin [33] proposes the concept of the two-party oblivious transfer (OT ) scheme in the cryptographic scenario. It has many flavors, such as, original oblivious transfer (OT ), 1-out-2 oblivious transfer (OT 1 2 ) and 1-out-n oblivious transfer (OT 1 n ). For OT , the sender S has only one secret m and would like to have the receiver R to obtain m with probability 0.5. On the other hand, R does not want S to know whether it gets m or not. For OT 1 2 , S has two secrets m 1 and m 2 and would like to give R one of them at R's choice. Again, R does not want S to know which secret it chooses. OT 1 n is a natural extension of OT 1 2 to the case of n secrets, in which S has n secrets m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n and is willing to disclose exactly one of them to R at R's choice. OT 1 n is also known as "all-or-nothing disclosure of secrets (ANDOS)" in which R is not allowed to gain combined information of the secrets, such as, their exclusive-or. Essentially, all these flavors are equivalent in the information theoretic sense [10, 13, 16] . Oblivious transfer is a fundamental primitive for cryptography and secure distributed computation [24, 26] and has many applications, such as, private information retrieval (PIR), fair electronic contract signing, oblivious secure computation, etc [6, 15, 22] .
A general approach for constructing an OT 1 n scheme is that we first construct a basis OT 1 2 scheme and then build the OT 1 n scheme by (explicitly or implicitly) invoking the basis OT 1 2 scheme for many runs, typically, n or log 2 n runs [10, 12, 28] . Another approach is to build an OT 1 n scheme from basic techniques directly [31, 32, 34, 36] In this paper we propose an efficient OT 1 n scheme for any n ≥ 2. We build our OT 1 n scheme from fundamental cryptographic techniques directly. It achieves optimal efficiency in the number of rounds and the total number of exchanged messages for the case that R's choice is unconditionally secure. The computation time of our OT 1 n scheme is very efficient. R need compute 2 modular exponentiations only no matter how large n is, and S need compute 2n modular exponentiations. By the speedup techniques [25] , S's computation time can be much reduced. The distinct feature of our scheme is that the system-wide parameters are independent of n and universally usable, that is, all possible receivers and senders use the same parameters and need no trapdoors (eg. factorization of N = pq) specific to each of them. For our OT 1 n scheme, the privacy of R's choice α is unconditionally secure and the secrecy of the un-chosen secrets m i , i = α, is based on hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. Our OT 1 n scheme can be parallelized to construct an OT k n scheme, in which R can get k secrets among n secrets at its choice.
We can combine our OT 1 n scheme with any secret sharing scheme to form an efficient distributed OT 1 n scheme [30] . In this setting, there are p servers. Each server holds partial information about the secrets m i 's. If R contacts t (the threshold) or more servers, it can compute m α of its choice; otherwise, it cannot get any information about the secrets. Our threshold OT 1 n scheme takes full advantage of the research results of secret sharing and is conceptually simple. In particular, we can construct access-structure distributed OT
For applications, we present a method of transforming any single-database PIR protocol into a symmetric PIR (SPIR) protocol with only one extra unit of communication cost. As SPIR is equivalent to OT 1 n , this transformation provides a reduction from PIR to OT 1 n with almost no extra communication cost. In particular, any computational PIR [27] , in which the receiver's choice is computationally private, with efficient communication complexity can be transformed to an OT 1 n scheme (with R's choice is computationally secure) with almost the same efficiency for communication complexity. Some communication-efficient singledatabase PIR schemes have been proposed [14, 27] .
Previous Work and Comparison
Oblivious transfer has been studied in various flavors and security models extensively (cf. [2, 5, 8, 10, 12, 18, 22, 28, 32, 34, 36] ). In particular, bit OT The reduction approach is studied in [9, 10, 12, 16, 28] . For example, a k-bit string OT 1 2 scheme can be achieved by invoking βk runs of a bit OT 1 2 scheme for some β, 2 ≤ β ≤ 18, [9, 10, 12] . In [28] , a string OT 1 n scheme is constructed by invoking log 2 n runs of a string OT 1 2 scheme. The generic construction is studied in [1, 22, 32, 34, 36, 31] . Stern [36] proposes a general construction for OT 1 n based on the public-key encryption scheme that has some specific properties. The privacy of the receiver's choice of the scheme is computationally secure. The scheme takes O( log 2 n) rounds if better efficiency for exchanged messages is desired.
Recently, Naor and Pinkas [31] proposes a two-round OT 1 n scheme that is computationally efficient in amortized analysis, that is, one modular exponentiation per invocation. In comparison, their scheme is indeed more efficient than ours in computation when the scheme is invoked many times. But, the system parameter of their scheme is O(n), while ours is a constant. Furthermore, our protocol can be extended to threshold oblivious transfer easily and used to transfer any PIR protocol into a SPIR protocol without increasing communication complexity. Aiello, etc. [1] proposes a general methodology for constructing a two-round OT 1 n scheme based on the homomorphic property of a public-key encryption scheme. But, no specific construction is given. Furthermore, in their construction, each receiver need a pair of public and private keys.
Distributed oblivious transfer has been studied in various contents under variant models, such as function evaluation [4] and private information retrieval [23] . Naor and Pinkas [30] identify the important attributes of distributed oblivious transfer. They propose a threshold OT 1 2 scheme such that R and the involved servers need do polynomial evaluation only. For comparison, in our distributed version the receiver and each server need one invocation of our OT 1 n scheme. Nevertheless, their scheme is only for threshold OT 1 2 , not threshold OT 1 n , and comes with cost of privacy and simplicity. For example, a coalition of less than t servers can compute R's choice. One scheme (based on sparse polynomials) is not secure against collusion of R and a single server. Some schemes cannot prevent R from learning linear combination of secrets. Furthermore R cannot contact more than t servers; otherwise, the scheme is not secure. On the contrary, in our scheme R's choice is unconditionally secure against any coalition of the servers.
In some sense, our schemes fall in the category of non-interactive oblivious transfer [5, 35] , in which R selects a public key and S performs non-interactive oblivious transfer using R's public key. The schemes in [35] are based on the quadratic residuosity assumption. Each R uses a specific Blum integer N that is re-usable by the R. The privacy of R's choice is computationally secure and the privacy of the un-chosen secret is unconditionally secure. The bit OT scheme exchanges O(k) bits and that of [35] exchanges O(k 2 ) bits. Transforming any PIR scheme to a symmetric PIR scheme has been studied in [20, 28] . Naor and Pinkas [28] show such a reduction using one call to the base PIR scheme and log 2 n calls to an OT 1 2 scheme. Crescenzo, etc [20] show a reduction using communication poly(k) times of that of the base PIR scheme, where k is the security parameter. In comparison, our reduction uses only one extra communication cost.
1-Out-n Oblivious Transfer
Let m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n be the secrets of S. We assume that S is honest, that is, it won't send secrets that are not the same as claimed ones, either in content or in order. An OT We first present a basic scheme that is secure against the curious (passive) receiver and then modify it to be secure against the active receiver.
OT

n against the Passive Receiver
Let g and h be two generators in G q of an order-q group, where q is prime. Let x ∈ R X denote that x is chosen uniformly and independently from the set X. We assume that the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem over G q is hard. That is, it is not possible to distinguish the following two distribution ensembles with a non-negligible advantage in polynomial time:
For simplicity, we omit the security parameter size(q) in the later arguments. Note that the DDH assumption is stronger than the discrete logarithm assumption. Typically, G q is the set of quadratic residues of Z * p , where p = 2q + 1 is also prime. Any element in G q \{1} is a generator of G q .
The system-wide parameters are (g, h, G q ), which can be used by all possible senders and receivers. Assume that the discrete logarithm log g h is unknown to all. As long as log g h is not revealed, g and h can be used repeatedly. Our OT 1 n scheme is as follows. Wlog, we assume that the secrets m i 's are all in G q . 
Correctness.
Efficiency. The scheme takes only two rounds. This is optimal since at least R has to choose α and let S know, and S has to respond to R's request. R sends one message y to S and S sends n messages c i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, to R. This is also optimal (within a constant factor of 2) by the argument for the lower bound Ω(n) of communication cost of the single-database PIR when R's choice is unconditionally secure [15] .
For computation, R need do 2 modular exponentiations for y and m α . Straightforwardly, S need do 2n modular exponentiations for c i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We can reduce the computation by using the fast exponentiation methods. Let l = log 2 q . S can pre-compute g 
Proof. Since the DDH assumption is stronger than the DL assumption, R cannot compute two different pairs of (r, α) and (r , α ) that both satisfy y = g r h α = g r h α . Otherwise, R computes log g h = (r − r)/(α − α ). Therefore, R cannot get two secrets.
We show that c i , i = α, looks random assuming that the DDH problem is hard. Formally, we define the random variable of c i as
where 
has the right form for C i , where
and Z with a non-negligible advantage , A distinguishes R and D with an advantage · (1 − 1/q) + 1/q, where 1/q is the offset probability in Step 1.
Without System-Wide Parameters
We can remove the requirement of using system-wide parameters (g, h, G q ). Now, S first chooses g, h and G q , and sends them to R, that is, the following step is added to the scheme.
S chooses (g, h, G q ) and sends them to R, where g, h ∈ R G q \{1}.
When R receives (g, h, G q ), it need check that q is prime, g = 1 and h = 1. Otherwise, if S chooses a non-prime q and g and h of small orders, it can get information about R's choice. Even if S knows log g h, R's choice α is still unconditionally secure.
OT
1 n against the Active Receiver R may compute y of some special form such that it can compute combined information of the secrets. We don't know whether such y exists. To prevent this attack, we can require R to send a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of r and α that satisfy y = g r h α , denoted by NI-ZKIP(g, h, y). The new step 1 of the OT 1 n scheme becomes:
1 . R sends y = g r h α and β = NI-ZKIP(g, h, y), where r ∈ R Z q .
In this case, S should check validity of NI-ZKIP(g, h, y) in Step 2. If the check fails, S aborts the protocol. In fact, this modification results in a very secure OT 1 n scheme. We shall discuss this in Section 7.
We can apply the technique in [31] so that the protocol is secure against the active R under the random oracle model, in which a one-way hash function is assumed to be a random function. Let H be a one-way hash function. We modify the steps 2 and 3 as: 
Theorem 3. The sender's privacy of the OT
k-Out-n Oblivious Transfer
We can have k parallel runs of the OT 1 n scheme to obtain an efficient OT k n scheme, which takes only two rounds. 
We can show that the OT k n scheme has the same correctness and security properties as those of the OT 1 n scheme. 
Threshold Oblivious Transfer
For a threshold t-out-of-p OT
and distributed shares m i,j , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, to server S j , 1 ≤ j ≤ p. Then, R chooses α, 1 ≤ α ≤ n, and contacts with any t or more servers to get information about the shares. We assume a mechanism, such as the broadcast channel, for ensuring that R contacts severs with the same request. By the received information, R should be able to compute m α and no others.
By [30] , a (t, p)-OT 1 n scheme should meet the following requirements: 1. Correctness: if R and servers follow the protocol and R receives information from t or more servers, R can compute one m α , where α is its choice.
2. Sender's privacy: even if R receives information from t or more servers, it gains no information about any other m i , 1 ≤ i = α ≤ n. Furthermore, if R receives information from less than t servers, it gains no information about any m i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. 3. Receiver's privacy: there is a threshold t , t ≥ 1, such that no coalition of less than t servers can gain any information about the choice α of R. The threshold t should be as large as possible. 4. Security against receiver-server collusion: after R gets m α , there is a threshold t , 1 ≤ t ≤ t, such that no coalition of less than t servers and R can gain any information about any other m i , 1 ≤ i = α ≤ n. The threshold t should be as close to t as possible.
By the OT 1 n scheme in Section 2, we can easily construct a threshold (t, p)-OT 1 n scheme. Our scheme can make use of any threshold secret sharing scheme. Our (t, p)-OT 1 n scheme achieves t = ∞ and t = t. Both are optimal. We construct our (t, p)-OT 1 n scheme using the standard (t, p)-secret-sharing scheme. Let m i be shared by the servers via polynomial 
Then, R interpolates these t shares to get
by Lagrange's interpolation method.
Correctness. If R contacts with t or more servers, it can compute t shares m α,j l of m α , 1 ≤ l ≤ t. Therefore, it can compute m α as shown in the scheme.
Efficiency. The scheme takes only two rounds. This is optimal, again. R sends one message y to t servers and each contacted server S j responds with n messages c i,j , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For computation, R need do t + 1 modular exponentiations for y and t shares m α,j l , 1 ≤ l ≤ t, and one Lagrange interpolation for m α . Each contacted server S j need do 2n modular exponentiations for c i,j , 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Security. Our (t, p)-OT
1 n scheme has the following security properties:
1. Sender's privacy: if R contacts with t or more servers, the privacy of m i , 1 ≤ i = α ≤ n, is at least as strong as the hardness of the DDH problem. (The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.) Furthermore, if R gets information from less than t servers, R cannot compute information about any m i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This is guaranteed by the polynomial secret sharing scheme we use. 2. Receiver's privacy is unconditionally secure. Since for any α , there is r that satisfies y = g r h α . Even if the servers have unlimited computing power, they cannot compute R's choice α. 3. It is secure against collusion of R and t-1 servers S r1 , S r2 , . . . , S rt−1 , assuming the hardness of the DDH problem. Since for R and S r l , 1 ≤ l ≤ t − 1, the privacy of shares m i,j , i = α, j = r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r t−1 , is at least as strong as the hardness of the DDH problem, R and these t-1 servers cannot compute any information about other secrets m i , 1 ≤ i = α ≤ n. 
(t, p)-OT
(p, p)-OT
r . It need do 2p − 1 modular multiplications and one modular exponentiations. 
Access-Structure Oblivious Transfer
Let Γ = {γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γ z } be a monotonic access structure over p servers We define Γ -OT 1 n such that R can get the secret m α from the servers in an authorized set γ ∈ Γ , where α is R's choice. The requirements for a satisfactory Γ -OT 1 n are the same as those for the threshold OT 1 n schemes in Section 4. We can combine our OT 1 n scheme and a general secret sharing scheme S to form a Γ -OT 1 n scheme as follows.
1. Let S j obtain a share m i,j of m i by the secret sharing scheme S, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. 2. Let γ be an authorized set that R contacts its servers to obtain m α . When R contacts S j ∈ γ with y = g r h α , S j responds with c i,
3. R computes m α,j for each S j ∈ γ and applies S(γ) to compute m α .
The above Γ -OT 1 n scheme meets the requirements. This can be proved by the same arguments for the threshold oblivious transfer schemes in Section 4. We omit them here.
Applications
Efficient string OT 1 n schemes can improve practical efficiency of the schemes in which oblivious transfer is used. One primary application is for private information retrieval (PIR), in which the user (U) wants to query one data block from a database, but U does not want the database manager (DBM) to know which data block he is interested in [15] . The regular PIR does not restrict U to obtain only one data block of the database. We consider the symmetric PIR (SPIR), in which DBM does not want to release more than one data block [23] . Assume that the database has n data blocks m i 's, each is in G q . The following steps achieve SPIR. U wants to obtain m α . This method transforms any single-database PIR scheme into a singledatabase SPIR scheme with only an extra unit of communication cost in step 1. If U's choice α of the base PIR scheme in Step 3 is computationally private, the transformed SPIR scheme's user privacy is computationally secure. On the other hand, if the base PIR scheme is unconditionally secure, the user's choice of the transformed SPIR is unconditionally private.
U sends
The transformed SPIR scheme uses at most one more round than that of the base PIR scheme. The reason is that the fist step may be combined with the first step of the base PIR in step 3. 
Further Security
Naor and Pinkas [28] give a very formal definition for security of OT Proof. Since R's choice is unconditionally secure, the scheme meets the requirement of Receiver's privacy.
For each probabilistic polynomial-time adversary R , substituting for R, in the real run, we can construct a corresponding R (in the Ideal Model) whose output is computationally indistinguishable from that of R as follows. R uses R as a re-settable subroutine. When R sends y and β = NI-ZKIP(g, h, y) to S, R simulates R to get α in a re-settable way with an overwhelming probability. If β is not legal or the simulation fails to produce α, TTP outputs ⊥ (abort). The probability of TTP outputting ⊥ is almost equal to that of S outputting ⊥. After obtaining α, R sends α to TTP and gets m α . R sets c α = (g k , m α (y/h α ) k ) and c i = (a i , b i ) for 1 ≤ i = α ≤ n, a i , b i ∈ R G q , and outputs the simulation result of R on c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n . The output of R is computationally indistinguishable from that of R . If there is a claim that R gets information about m α , α = α. We can use R to solve the DDH problem by manipulating its input c i 's, which is similar to the proof of Theorem 2. Therefore, the scheme meets the requirement of Sender's privacy.
Conclusion
We have presented an efficient (string) OT 1 n scheme and extended it to construct threshold, access-structure and verifiable OT k n schemes for any n ≥ 2 and 1 ≤ k ≤ n. We also present its application on private information retrieval. It is interesting to find more applications of this construction.
